Logic in seventeenth-century Scottish academic philosophy by Gellera, Giovanni
Gellera, Logic in Seventeenth-Century Scottish Academic Philosophy 
1 
 
Title Page 
 
 
Logic in seventeenth-century Scottish academic philosophy 
 
Giovanni Gellera 
ORCID IDENTIFIER 0000-0002-8403-3170 
 
Section de philosophie, Université de Lausanne 
giovanni.gellera@unil.ch 
 
 
Penultimate draft. The Version of Scholarly Record of this article is published 
in: 
 
Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century, edited by Alexander Broadie. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 111−126. 
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/scottish-philosophy-in-the-seventeenth-century-
9780198769842?cc=gb&lang=en& 
 
 
Abstract 
For a seventeenth-century Scottish regent, logic was preliminary to all other disciplines and 
secondary only to Latin. Logic was the trait-d’union between natural language (Latin, 
grammar, classical literature, the Bible) and the technical philosophical jargon. Logic was 
also important for theology and apologetics. 
Until the 1650s, logic is scholastic, centred on the trivium of logic, rhetoric, and grammar. 
The influence of Humanism, especially Ramism, is visible in the importance of induction, the 
treatment of method as a branch of logic, the orientation of logic towards practical tasks. 
Later in the century, alongside Aristotle, the key figures are René Descartes and Francis 
Bacon. The “old” Aristotelian logic is made compatible with the “new” method for the 
acquisition of new truths developed from Cartesian and Baconian insights. The reception of 
Descartes and Bacon has a common root in scholastic empiricism. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Logic in seventeenth-century Scottish academic philosophy 
 
Giovanni Gellera 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The teaching of logic has an important place in the curriculum the seventeenth-century 
Scottish Faculties of Arts.1 It can be broadly divided into the pre-1650s period and the post-
1650s period, during which ‘modern’—that is, for the present purposes, non-scholastic—
philosophers are integrated into the curriculum. 
Until the 1650s, logic is scholastic, centred on the trivium of logic, rhetoric, and grammar, 
and especially on Aristotle’s Categories and Posterior Analytics. Underneath the scholastic 
surface, one can detect the influence of Humanism on the regents’ conception of logic, 
especially Ramism: the importance of induction, the treatment of method as a branch of logic, 
the orientation of logic towards practical and useful tasks. This latter aspect is characteristic 
of the Scottish academic philosophy of the period, including ethics and natural philosophy.2 
Though Rudolph Agricola and Pierre de la Ramée appear very rarely in the early 
seventeenth-century texts, there is a “general accrued baggage of intellectual discourse as 
shaped by both scholasticism and humanist logic”,3 and a “mixed approach which combines 
Aristotelian logic with Ramist method.”4 
In the second half of the century, alongside Aristotle the key figures are René Descartes 
and Lord Francis Bacon.5 The Aristotelian stress on clear premises and consistence in the 
 
1 As argues Broadie 2009: 87‒90, logic has an illustrious history in Scottish philosophy, from the circle of John 
Mair in the early 16c Paris, to the “lively fashion” in which philosophy continued during the 16c. See Chapter 5 
for a survey of 16c Scottish philosophy and the arrival of Humanism. 
2 Shepherd 1975: 166‒168: “the emphasis was above all on the practical nature of ethics, and its usefulness as a 
guide to life.” See Christian Maurer’s chapter in this volume on moral philosophy. 
3 Reid 2011: 189. 
4 Hutton 2015: 38. 
5 Shepherd 1975: 62: “One feels that Descartes and others have been fitted into a framework which is basically 
Aristotelian.” 
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arguments is enriched with the method for the acquisition of new truths developed from 
Cartesian and Baconian insights. Towards the end of the century, Bacon’s philosophy finds 
its place within an empiricist interpretation of Descartes. Arguably, the common root here is 
scholastic empiricism. Though Bacon is chronologically earlier than Descartes, the reception 
of Cartesianism in the Scottish universities is earlier and more systemic, and it ultimately 
shapes the reception of Bacon. The regents have a generally compatibilist understanding of 
the relations between ‘old’ and ‘new’ logic, where ‘old’ is understood in the modern sense of 
scholastic logic in general, not as in the medieval division of the Aristotelian corpus into 
logica vetus (Isagoges, Categories, On Interpretation) and logica nova (Analytics, Topics, On 
Sophistical Refutations). Like other first-generation Cartesians, such as Johannes Clauberg, 
the regents propose a Logica Vetus et Nova: Aristotelian logic deals with inference and 
exposition of truth, Cartesian “logic” deals with the acquisition of the material principle of 
logic: clear and distinct ideas. Arguably, the regents substituted Aristotle’s Topics with 
Descartes’ analytic method and methodological doubt of Meditationes I–III. 
To a 17c Scottish regent, logic was preliminary to all other disciplines. In a way, it was 
secondary only to Latin, studied since child age, and grammar, both necessary for higher 
studies. Logic was the trait-d’union between natural language (Latin, grammar, classical 
literature, the Bible) and the technical philosophical jargon. Though not properly a part of 
philosophy nor a science—logic was considered an art—logic is inseparable from philosophy 
teaching. It was taught during the first year of the four-year curriculum, and in the following 
years trained in the many hours that the students spent formalising arguments and debating. 
Rhetoric was integral to this teaching style, and the Theses philosophicae themselves are an 
exercise in the presentation of philosophical views. During the graduation ceremony, the 
students would publicly debate pro et contra a given view to show their eloquence and 
knowledge. The debate was conducted in strict respect of syllogistic logic. Finally, logic was 
also important for theology and apologetics. Admittedly less so than the Catholic universities, 
the Reformed Faculties of Theology praised the importance of logic—hence of philosophy—
in the defence of true faith. A seventeenth-century student at a Scottish university would then 
see, in good scholastic fashion, a strong unity in the education he received from the dual 
perspective of its Reformed credentials and of the application of logic to all disciplines. 
 
The first part of this paper covers the scholastic, Reformed, and Humanist elements of 
logic teaching until the 1650s, with focus on the logical dimension of the Doctrine of the Fall, 
and the theses by Edinburgh regent William King (1612) and Glasgow regent James 
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Dalrymple (1646). The second part of the paper investigates logic teaching after the 1650s: 
the influence of Cartesian and Baconian philosophy, and the legacy of the Aristotelian 
categories of thought. The regents taught a synthesis of Aristotelian logic and the new 
philosophical method. Considering how little known the Scottish Theses logicae are, ample 
space is given to the original texts. 
 
1. Scholasticism, Humanism, and the Reformation 
 
Logic and the psychology of the doctrine of the Fall 
 
Belief in the corruption of human nature because of the Fall was fundamental in the 
worldview of a seventeenth-century Scottish regent. When subjected to philosophical 
scrutiny, the Doctrine of the Fall bears directly on the understanding of the capacities and 
limits of our intellectual powers. Depending on the definitions we find in the Theses 
philosophicae, logic is the ars or the habitus instrumentalis which directs and orders our 
second intentions (the intentiones secundae, or concepts, are the proper object of logic and 
represent the intentiones primae, the things) to make good judgments and arguments. The St 
Salvator regent John Baron writes in 1627: “Logic is the effective habit of the secondary 
notions, to which the human mind is directed in the acquisition and conservation of the 
knowledge of things.”6 The regents were aware that logic, though essential, has to do with 
faulty raw materials and instruments: the external things are obscure to us, and error lurks in 
the operations of the mind, apprehension, judgment, and discourse. 
The discussion of the Fall typically introduces the Theses logicae. This belief could find 
supporting evidence in some scholastic topoi: chiefly the limits of natural reason and 
philosophy, especially with respect to the higher discipline of theology, and the experience of 
the fallibility of our judgments. It is not surprising that the regents would take corruption as a 
psychological fact of our nature and a sensible philosophical principle. The Edinburgh regent 
William King writes in 1612 that: “The human intellect or reason, especially after the 
lamentable Fall of man from his primeval integrity, cannot apply itself with certitude and 
confidence to the ordinate and distinct understanding of things, and cannot judge truth only 
 
6 Baron 1627: TL I: “Logica est habitus effectivus, secundarum notionum, quibus mens humana dirigitur in 
acquirenda, et conservanda rerum cognitione.” All translations are my own. 
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with its own powers.”7 Similar views in the Edinburgh regent George Robertson in 1596,8 
and St Leonard regent Jacob Wemyss, who writes in 1612 about “Adam’s lamentable fall”.9 
Logic works as a remedy to the Fall. Regent Wemyss argues that, because of the Fall, “the 
connection of philosophy and the human condition clearly manifests itself, for the former is 
the end of the latter.”10 St Salvator regent John Ramsay in 1629 claims that the human mind 
is in an original state of darkness,11 but also that we drive a desire to philosophy precisely 
from this state, and quotes Cicero on this matter.12 The ‘original darkness’ is the 
psychological motif behind the desire to put order in our mental states by the use of logic.13 
There is a good Humanist vibe to Ramsay’s talk of particles of the divine spark innate in the 
human mind (“particula divinae aurae hominibus insita”), and to his optimism about logic 
directing the operations of the mind.14 In this context, a recurring expression in the Theses is 
“morbis mentis mederi”: whoever wants “to cure the disease of the mind” has to teach and 
direct the mind,15 and the use of order and method is a necessary condition for such a cure.16 
Though only occasionally, the regents treat the relationship between logic and theology, 
and regent Ramsay is uniquely outspoken for the usefulness of philosophy. In theology, many 
practical terms recur, such as virtue, justice, liberality; likewise, many things in the Psalms, 
the book of Moses, and Job pertain to astronomy, physics, and geography. Without a solid 
knowledge of philosophy these terms, and the Scriptures, would not be correctly 
understood.17 Ramsay reads an incentive to philosophy in the Apostle Paul’s Letter to Titus 
 
7 King 1612: TL 1.I: “Intellectus seu Ratio humana, praesertim post flebilem illum hominis lapsum a primaeva 
sua integritate, non potest sese certo ac fideliter determinare ad rerum naturas ordinate et distincte 
comprehendendas, veritatemque proprijs virtutibus disjudicandam.” 
8 Robertson 1596: TP I: “Lapsu flebili, non modo paralysi dissoluti affectus, transuersum acta voluntas, sed & 
Thebanis sphingibus, Cymmerijs tenebris obtenebrata mens.” 
9 Wemyss 1612: TL I.2: “flebilem Adami lapsum”. 
10 Wemyss 1612: TL 2.II: “Hinc tanta refulget Philosophiae cum hominis conditione connexio, ut unius sit 
utriusque finis.” 
11 Ramsay 1629: TL I: “Mens humana in tenebris”. 
12 Ramsay 1629: TL I.1: “Cicer. lib. I. offic.  innatum scientiae atque adeo Philosophiae desiderium.” 
13 Beautifully clear, though not motivated by the Fall, is King’s College regent John Forbes’ psychological 
justification of logic (Forbes 1624: TL I-VII): from the division of sciences, to the realisation that some things 
are mental (entia rationis), to the need to arrange them in imitation of the order of the external things. 
14 Ramsay 1629: TL II.3. See also Fairley (1615): TL XIV: “Certum est lumen intellectuale nostrum”. 
15 Knox 1605: TL I.1: “Qui morbis mentis mederi velit, oportet doceat, oportet dirigat.” 
16 Wemyss 1612: TL 7.I: “Ordinis et methodi usus necessario requiritur.” 
17 Ramsay 1629: TL II.4-5: “quae absque Philosophiae cognitione solide, seu par est explicari nequeunt.” 
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I.9, when he writes that the bishop has to be potent in exhorting the faithful and in arguing 
against the unfaithful. Neither can be accomplished by a theologian without a philosophical 
background.18 
The students of the Scottish universities were taught that logic is necessary to put order to 
our mental states, originally affected by the Fall. Logic has great scope in both philosophy 
and theology, and it exemplifies how philosophy is propedeutic to theology. So believed 
Andrew Melville, in “a clear blend of [...] Ramism and Aristotelianism, working together to 
give divinity students a firm and logical grounding in the articulation of doctrine.”19 Before 
Melville, in the circle of John Mair “the logic and philosophy developed by the medieval 
logicians were theologians’ tools.”20 I now turn to the presentation of the core views in logic 
and of the Humanist and scholastic aspects. 
 
Logic between Humanism and scholasticism 
 
Besides the Reformed doctrine of the Fall, logic teaching follows some identifiable patterns.21 
The regents debate the status of logic as an art or as an instrumental habit,22 and the related 
question of whether logic is a part of philosophy.23 The regents typically interpret the 
Categories as a metaphysical text and basically treat metaphysics in logic.24 Syllogism and 
order are typically understood as the two main instruments of logic,25 in its task to direct the 
 
18 Ramsay 1629: TL II.7: “quod sane Theologus sine Philosophia ad Graecas Calendas praestabit.” Note the 
pun: calendes are in the Roman, not Greek, calendar: “Graecae calendes” means “never”. 
19 Reid 2011: 7. Reid argues that Ramus’ method was part of the ideological programme to recruit students to 
radical Presbyterianism (59). 
20 Broadie 2009: 87. 
21 See Reid 2011: 20 and ff. for the outline of the logic curriculum, and chapters 7-8 for the analysis of logical 
theses until 1625; see Hutton 2015: chapter 2 for a comparison of logic teaching in England and Scotland in the 
17c. 
22 Logic is ars: Craig 1599: TL I.; King 1612: TL II-III; Baron 1621: TL 4. Habitus effectivus: Baron 1627: TL 
I; Habitus directivus: Stevenson 1625: TL I.5; Habitus instrumentarius: Sibbald 1625: TL II. 
23 In favour: Aedie 1616: TL II.3: logic is both an instrument and a part of philosophy “quum manus fabri sit 
instrumentum simul et pars”. Against: Wemyss 1612: TL 7.II; Ramsay 1629: TL II.3; Sibbald 1625: TL I. 
24 Baron 1621: TL 17-24 discusses God, Angels, substance, quantity, place, time, and movement. Similarly, 
Lunan 1622. On the contrary, the Saumur regent Marc Duncan argues that the Categories is only a logic text in 
Duncan 1610: TL IIII. 
25 Craig 1599: TL 4.I; Baron 1621: TL 6; Baron 1627: TL I.5. 
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mind.26 The syllogism is routinely praised as a very useful instrument: only the Edinburgh 
regent Knox criticizes the syllogism as the offspring of ignorance because the real experts do 
not need it.27 
Regent Knox opposes Ramus to the Peripatetics, in one of the rare direct quotations of 
Ramus (par. 3). Knox probably believed, like most regents, that the syllogism is very apt at 
presenting a truth, but much less so at discovering one. So the Edinburgh regent James 
Fairley writes in 1615 that: “experiments and induction are required in order to give assent to 
whatever first principles”.28 Or St Leonard’s regent Jacob Wemyss, who in 1612 gives a 
psychological reason for the importance of induction: “every argument must proceed from 
unknown to known [...] Induction is the best instrument for the notification [of ideas], and is 
most congruous to our nature.”29 It is tempting to conclude that some regents reflected the 
general shift in early modern philosophy from the Categories and Posterior Analytics to the 
practical and epistemological concerns of the Topics: hence, from the exposition of an 
acquired truth, to the acquisition of new truths.30 The importance of induction, centrality of 
method treated under logic, clarification of the error of the mind,31 clarity and simplicity of 
exposition are all themes plausibly influenced by Ramus’ legacy in the Scottish universities 
via Melville. Different approaches to scholastic and Humanist logic are found in regents 
William King and James Dalrymple. 
 
William King and James Dalrymple 
William King at Edinburgh in the 1610s and James Dalrymple, later First Viscount Stair, in 
Glasgow in the early 1640s are among the most qualified regents of the seventeenth century. 
King taught for nearly two decades and authored five sets of theses in 1612, 1616, 1620, 
1624, and 1628. Dalrymple was a regent in Glasgow between 1641 and 1647. His early 
thought is particularly interesting considering his later fame as jurist and natural philosopher, 
quite an exceptional career with respect to the average regent. 
 
26 Schewer 1614: TL VI; Fairley 1615: TL I.6.I. 
27 Knox 1605; TL 6. Interestingly, regent Knox is also critical of Ramism: see Reid 2011: 215‒216. 
28 Fairley 1615: XIV.4: “ad primum assensum quoruncumque Principiorum requiritur experimentum et 
inductio”. 
29 Wemyss 1612: TL 28 and 28.II: “Omnis argumentatio, a noto ad ignotum debet procedere [...] Inductio 
instrumentum etiam notificandi aptissimum est, et naturae nostrae congruens.” 
30 Losonsky 2006: 171. 
31 Knox 1605: TL 2. 
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William King’s Theses Logicae, 1612 
As we have seen above, regent King introduces his theses with the discussion of the Fall and 
of how our mind wanders in the dark in need of guidance (par. 1.I). Logic is the “queen and 
leader of the arts” (“artium reginam et dominam”, par. 1.II) and defined as “the rule of 
understanding, and of the direction of the intellect [...] so that the obscurities of our mind be 
dissipated by the rays of its precepts.”32 There is a clear consequentialist sense of the utility 
and goal of logic in King: logic is useful because it teaches us to discern truth from falsehood, 
and because it clarifies what is unclear. Logic is about reasoning (ratio) and discourse 
(oratio) (par. III) because it directs how we think as well as how we communicate our 
thoughts. The adequate object of logic is the mode of knowledge common to all 
instruments,33 and its foundation, at once psychological and ontological, is the real operations 
of the intellect: apprehension, judgment, and discourse. The diverse parts of logic correspond 
to these distinct operations of the mind. The two main instruments of logic are syllogismus 
and ordo (par. 3.I). ‘Order’ is defined as “the disposition of prior and posterior things for a 
more distinct and easy understanding.”34 By nature, we assent more easily to things which are 
presented in a clear way. The first four paragraphs of King’s theses seem to bear the 
influence of Ramism (though Ramus is never mentioned) in the stress on clarity, usefulness, 
order, method, presentation of truth, and the attention to the psychological aspect of assent. 
The rest of the theses treat the following topics, not always with a clear connection with 
logic per se: second notions, as in similitude with the things (par. 7), actio (par. 8), essentia 
(par. 10) where King seems to hold that metaphysical and logical predicaments are the same 
(par. 10.IIII), quantity and accidents (par. 11), a reductionist account of relatio (par. 14), a 
representationalist view of voces (par. 17), truth (par. 19), which King defines as the 
“conformity of the thing understood and the intellect, or words” (“conformitate rei intellectae, 
et intellectus seu vocis”). Paragraph 24 goes back to the initial methodological remarks: we 
ought to infer in a careful way because the principles are more evident than the conclusions, 
and because “evidence is the cause of certainty”. King does not structure his theses as a 
commentary to Aristotle: there is no direct treatment of the Categories, Isagoges, or 
Analytics, and of the syllogism and the predicables. King’s main preoccupations are the 
 
32 King 1612: TL 1.III: “Logica ars, ac regula intelligendi, ad intellectum dirigendum [...] suis preceptorum 
radijs mentis nostrae nebulas discutiat.” 
33 King 1612: 3.III: “modus sciendi omnibus instrumentis communis”. 
34 King 1612: 4.I: “priora cum posterioribus ad distinctiorem, facilioremque nostra cognitionem disponere.” 
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importance of logic for the Reformed faith, the clarity and usefulness of the right method in 
philosophy, and an ontology vaguely inspired to a metaphysical interpretation of Aristotle’s 
Categories. 
 
James Dalrymple’s Theses Logicae, 1646 
James Dalrymple stands out as a rather original regent. His theses suggest that in the 1640s 
some news of modern philosophy must have reached Glasgow. It is regrettable that no other 
theses have survived from the same period in Glasgow, though it seems fair to assume that 
Dalrymple’s stature surpassed that of his colleagues. 
Dalrymple seems to hold that some content of our mind is innate in his talk of ennoia and 
dianoia (par. II): this is not strictly speaking a scholastic view and it might have been 
influenced by some versions of Stoicism, Platonism, or perhaps early Cartesianism. Logic is 
an art and it is said, somehow circularly, that: “the whole art, in the realisation of the object, 
inclines to the proposed idea according to the precise imitation of the precepts of the art.”35 
What does the art of logic do? It provides the very short and certain rules for categorisations, 
definitions, and enunciations. Dalrymple invokes logic as the “clearest, shortest, and easiest” 
of all disciplines (“clarissima, brevissima, et facillima”, par. XI). He conceives logic not as a 
complex system of rules, inferences, ontological interpretations of the predicables and 
categories, and a discipline with ramifications in dialectics and rhetoric; rather, as a lean, 
practical set of rules for thinking clearly. The practical dimension of logic is exemplified in 
the division in paragraph IX. There, the arts in general are said to be invented to make up for 
our (physical) shortcomings: some pertain to the external body (the mechanical arts) and 
some others to the mind, and are called liberal, chiefly logic. It is a tantalisingly Baconian 
passage, though no reference to Bacon is made. 
Dalrymple takes side in the old scholastic, as well as modern, debate on the enumeration 
of the categories. In Paragraph XVI he writes that it does not matter whether the categories 
are ten, twelve, or six, because what matters is their psychological grounding: our need to put 
an order to “the indistinct multiplicity of things” (“rerum indistinctam multiplicitatem”). Our 
nature is such that we learn better step by step than all at once (par. XXIV). He then 
concludes with some interesting remarks on method: “Method lies undeservedly neglected 
amidst the tools of logic. Although it only just yields to the syllogism, method by far 
 
35 Dalrymple 1646: TL V: “Ars in objecti effectionem propositam Ideam secundum praecepta Artis praecise 
imitando tota propendit.” 
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surpasses all the other instruments of logic in light of the nobility and utility of its 
service.”36 Method’s main service is to facilitate the process of learning by providing 
cohesion and order, hence it is the source of memory (“methodus ergo est Mater memoriae”, 
par. XLVI). 
King 1612 and Dalrymple 1646 show a similar interest, of Ramist influence, in the 
treatment of method in logic. Dalrymple seems to strike more modern notes than King, which 
remind us of Descartes’ Discours de la méthode. 
 
The Theses as an example of philosophical texts 
Logic includes rhetoric, and the Theses philosophicae are an example of what the regents 
considered as a proper philosophical text. The Theses do not aim at comprehensiveness in the 
way essays and dictates do, yet “they contain more advanced views than were being voiced in 
the dictates”37 because of their dual nature as a public pronouncement by the regents and of 
examination text for the students. 
Humanist influence is visible in the outlook of the Theses. The Theses vary in style. They 
are usually structured with a main thesis [I, II, ...], followed by sub-theses [1, 2, ...] with a 
clarificatory aim and a more or less evident deductive chain. It can be a direct citation of 
Aristotle, or a philosophical proposition. Occasionally short treatises are included (as in 
Lundie, 1627), and the lists of the questions that the students will discuss (as in Ramsay 
1629). Quite interesting are the attempts to, in all likelihood, apply some Ramist principles in 
the use of graphics for the clarification of concepts. A good example is found in the Theses of 
1605 by Edinburgh regent Knox. The main thesis (TL II) is the now familiar view that our 
mind is riddle with errors in its first operations. Sub-thesis 2 (par. II.2) states that the 
instruments of logic serve the investigation of truth, the enlightening of obscurity, and the 
provision of order in knowledge. Sub-thesis 3 splits into two sub-paragraphs, visually 
arranged into two opposite columns. Paragraphs II.3‒4‒5 discuss logic vis-a-vis philosophy, 
while paragraphs II. 3*–4*–5* discuss logic vis-a-vis theology. The regent then presents two 
different arguments. In philosophy, no logic is perfect, and neither Plato’s nor Aristotle’s 
opinion is evidence of truth. In theology, logic is supremely useful because it teaches against 
 
36 Dalrymple 1646: TL XLV: “Methodus inter Instrumenta Logica immerito neglecta jacet, quae vix syllogismo 
cedit, reliquisque omnibus longe supereminet, pro nobilitate et utilitate offici sui.” 
37 Shepherd 1975: 62. 
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errors, and theological errors are impious and dangerous. Nevertheless, it is ultimately 
arrogant to ask whether theology can be treated with logic.38 
 
2. Logic and modern philosophy 
 
The critique of scholastic logic 
 
Part of the rhetoric of the new philosophy was the critique of scholasticism as pointlessly 
complex, excessively verbal, and detrimental to good philosophy. The regents are no 
exception. Before the enthusiasm for the new philosophy of Descartes, which gains 
popularity in the 1670s, the critique of scholastic logic targets two specific debates: whether 
logic is an art, a science, or an instrumental habit, and the enumeration of the predicables and 
categories. The Marischal College Alexander White in 1657 complains of the numerous lists 
of predicables (par. 6). His colleague George Meldrum in 1659 writes that the debates on the 
definition of logic are quarrels about words (“de voce litigia”, par. I) and that the number of 
categories is decided by each philosopher (“pro opponentis arbitrio”, par. 5). The St 
Salvator’s regent William Campbell in 1657 writes that logic is propedeutic to philosophy 
and gives a traditional definition of it; yet, quite uniquely, he argues that “to the greater 
benefit of the students, and less labour for the teacher” metaphysics, arithmetic, and geometry 
ought to be studied before logic, and that logic is included in these disciplines, when the 
correct method is applied. Consequently, he is the only regent who does not treat logic at all: 
“We shall discuss no logical theses.”39 
The declining consideration for scholasticism is inversely proportional to the status of the 
Jesuits as the regents’ polemical targets. St Leonard’s regent William Sanders attacks the 
Jesuits, especially in natural philosophy, for the “violence” they did to philosophy. He claims 
that the traditional role of logic as the gateway to philosophy is in tatters because of the futile 
questions and poor achievements of scholastic logic: logic has become an obstacle to learning 
(par. I). Logic needs to be restored with the elimination of strange topics and the detection of 
prejudices thanks to the use of right reason, “so that we are set free from the confusion and 
obscurity of our perceptions, the error and doubt in our judgments, and the weakness of our 
 
38 Knox 1605: II.3‒5. See also Stevenson 1625; 1629. 
39 Campbell 1657: Theses proemiales II: “Nullas itaque Theses logicas ponimus.” 
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memory.”40 The right application of this new logic would bring about a “massacre of Jesuit 
philosophy”.41 
The antischolastic verve of the regents did not lose momentum later in the century. King’s 
College regent George Skene attacks the scholastic “laughable division of termini” and the 
enumerations of predicables “which are two, five, or five-hundred”, and which ultimately rest 
on the philosopher’s fancy.42 The Edinburgh regent Robert Lidderdale writes in 1685 that the 
Peripatetics left logic in a lamentable state, burdened with empty questions about its genus 
and end, object, status, name, usefulness, mental beings, universals, and the number of the 
categories.43 The three operations of the mind and the syllogism aside, this list tellingly 
includes all the main topics of logic teaching early in the century. 
The regents do not defect in irony in their polemics either. The Edinburgh regent Herbert 
Kennedy opens his 1686 theses with the following words: “huge volumes swarm with useless 
questions repeated to the reader’s nausea [...] in which one cannot hear anything but 
formaliter et subjective, primo et secundo intentionaliter, akrizas, paxulas, kai 
aitidikrimonias; these monstrous words are better suited for an exorcism than for a school.”44 
Indeed, rhetoric is not missing in the Theses. Let us now look at the regents’ solution to all of 
logic’s faults: Descartes’s method. 
 
Logic as method: Descartes and Bacon 
 
The regents put a strong accent on the practical conception of logic already in the first half of 
the century. Logic’s task is to direct the mind, clarify error, order our thoughts and language. 
This is the meaning they attach to the scholastic definitions of logic as ars or habitus 
instrumentalis. Some regents talk of induction as the right method in philosophy, and in 
general Ramist methodological concerns seem to occupy them as much as the treatment of 
 
40 Sanders 1674: I: “ut a confusione et obscuritate Perceptionum, errore et dubitatione Judiciorum, ac oblivione 
Memoriae liberemur.” From the 1670s the theses are not anymore arranged per discipline: the reference thus 
changes from, e.g. ‘Logical theses par. I’ to simply ‘paragraph I’. 
41 Sanders 1674: II: “Vah quanta definitionum strages in Philosophia Jesuitica committeretur, si rite haec regula 
colatur!” 
42 Skene 1688: V.4 and V.5: “Duo sunt, quinque, aut quingenta.” 
43 Lidderdale 1685: IV. The scholastics have left behind them a “horridum Logicae desertum”. 
44 Kennedy 1686: I: “ingentia volumina scatent inutilibus et ad nauseam usque repetitis quaestionibus [...] Ubi 
nihil audiri potest, praeter formaliter et subjective, primo et secundo intentionaliter, akrizas, paxulas, kai 
aitidikrimonias; ac istiusmodi vocum monstra, Exorcismis quam scholis aptiora.” 
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the predicables, categories, and syllogism. It seems that the mixed scholastico/Humanist logic 
of the first half of the century was ready for the reception of Descartes’ new method of 
discovery. From the 1670s, the accent is on acquisition of truth, scepticism, avoidance of 
error, epistemology of certitude and belief. The main themes are: 1) the Cartesian co-
implication of the formal and material aspects of method: the new method delivers the new 
metaphysics of Descartes; 2) the importance of belief in judgment; and 3) Baconian 
induction. 
 
Cartesian method 
 
Whereas the old scholastic logic delivered endless debates, the new method is simple, self-
evident (something hoped by Dalrymple in 1646), and univocal in its deliverance: the 
Cartesian Cogito, substance dualism of mind and matter, the existence of God, all follow 
from the right application of method. This connection between method and a specific 
metaphysics is common in the Theses. The right method clears the mind of the obstacles to 
knowledge, so the mind can obtain the true perceptions which, if correctly understood and 
arranged, produce knowledge of the external things. 
Regent Sanders in 1674, among the first regents to teach Descartes’ metaphysics, writes 
that the new logic finally provides instructions on how to obtain the sought-after “clarity in 
perceptions” (“perceptionum perspicuitas”) which is needed to form true and certain 
judgments on things (par. III). The Aristotelians might reply that this is precisely the goal of 
the Topics, although the scholastics seem to have been overall negligent with this book.45 The 
Humanists might argue, in their own right, that the regents (and Descartes) took this approach 
from Rudolph Agricola and Pierre de la Ramée; this is probably correct, though a direct 
influence on the Scottish sources is difficult to prove. It is fair to say that the regents 
subscribed to a widespread assumption in modern philosophy: that our knowledge has to be 
rebuilt on solid foundations. Hence “cum Cartesio dubitare” is the gateway to avoiding 
mistakes and prejudices, to the suspension of judgment, and to obtaining clear and distinct 
perceptions.46 
 
45 Gaukroger 2006: 160: “Aristotle’s original method of discovery, the topics, became lost [...] and his method 
of demonstration—syllogistic—came to be construed as method per se.” 
46 These points are very common in the Theses, for example: Sanders 1674: III; Cockburn 1675: I and III; 
Middleton 1675: IV; Grant 1676: I; Lidderdale 1685: IV, More 1699: II. 
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The Edinburgh regent MacMurdo in 1682 seals the connection of logic and the principle 
of clear and distinct ideas: “Since Logic is the art of using well our reason in the acquisition 
of knowledge [...] if we follow it well we can only accept as true [the principle] that what has 
been thought of in a certain and evident way, is true.”47 The new method seems to reinforce 
the psychological dimension of the scholastic tripartition (“trina operatio”) of apprehension, 
judgment, and discourse. The mind works in three stages in order to produce knowledge but 
also, the simplicity of the new method reflects some important psychological facts about the 
mind: that “the mind naturally moves from the few to the many, from simple to composite 
things, and from awareness of particulars to the knowledge of universals.”48 Hence, two 
considerations arise: the reliability of such perceptions, and the status of induction. 
 
Perceptions and belief49 
 
Regent Dalrymple in 1646 discussed certainty in these terms: “Certainty does not belong to 
the first utterance, rather to judgment and assent.”50 He had in mind the scholastic tripartition 
of apprehension, judgment, and discourse and the view that truth (and falsehood) are the 
product of a complex act of the mind which reflects upon itself and judges the 
correspondence of the thing represented in the mind and the mental act. Truth is not obtained 
directly in perception or in first utterances. The Marischal College regent Robert Forbes 
emended this view in 1660: “Simple apprehension if the first operation of the intellect. It has 
two aspects, one complex, the other not. Truth is in both, falsehood in neither.”51 The view 
gains popularity in the latter part of the century, in regent Skene for example: “There is some 
truth in simple apprehension, but not falsehood; in fact, it is but a bare representation.”52 
Skene adds a crucial aspect to Forbes’ view: the deliverance of truth is justified by a direct 
 
47 MacMurdo 1682: I: “Cum Logica sit Ars bene utendi ratione in rerum cognitione acquirenda [...] si eam rite 
sequamur nihil ut quam tanquam verum admittemus, nisi quod certo et evidenter verum esse cognitum fuerit.” 
48 MacMurdo 1682: VI: “Mens naturaliter fertur a paucis ad multa, a simplicibus ad composita, et a 
particularium notitia, ad universalium cognitionem.” 
49 I have treated this theme elsewhere in relation with the Scottish Common Sense view of perception: Gellera 
2018. 
50 Dalrymple 1646: TL XXX: “Certitudo non inest primo enunciatum, sed judicio et assensui.” 
51 Forbes 1660: TL IX: “Apprehensio simplex est intellectus operatio prima. Estque duplex, una incomplexa, 
complexa altera. Utrique inest veritas, falsitas neutri.” 
52 Skene 1688: V.7: “In apprehensione simplici datur veritas aliqua, falsitas non item; ea namque repraesentatio 
nuda est.” 
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realist account of apprehension. Coherent with this view is that the mind produces a sort of 
judgment already at the perception level, as in King’s College regent Alexander More in 
1695: “Bare and simple Perception intimately coheres with Judgment; so that a Judgment 
corresponds to each perception.”53 
It is now clearer how the new Cartesian method and logic interact, and how Reformed 
concerns about the natural corruption of the mind are answered by the new philosophy. 
Within a direct realist framework of scholastic origin, Cartesian method helps purge the mind 
of all the obstacles to knowledge (prejudices, hallucinations, errors): the mind is finally 
equipped to philosophize, and its perceptions become intrinsically reliable. This content is 
later arranged in scientific order with the instruments provided by traditional scholastic logic: 
namely, the syllogism. We will see this point below in the discussion of the Aristotelian 
legacy. In the mind of the regents, Cartesian method helps achieve the desired goal of logic 
vis-à-vis the Doctrine of the Fall: a clear path towards amending our corrupt faculties.54 
 
Bacon and induction 
 
Some of the considerations made by the regents in the early seventeenth century about 
prejudices and error, the simplification of logic, induction, and the critique of syllogism, have 
a Baconian ring. Bacon is never mentioned in the early theses, and he himself followed in the 
wake of Humanists before him, such as Agricola and Ramus. Only in the 1680s one finds an 
explicit reception of Bacon, within the now established Cartesianism of the philosophy 
curriculum. 
Descartes and Bacon are occasionally pitched against one another as masters of method, 
and the regents argue for their favourite. Marischal College regent Robert Keith in 1687 
ignores Bacon and praises Descartes for freeing us from infancy prejudices, whereas his 
colleague at Marischal George Peacock is a convinced supporter of Bacon. In 1689, he opens 
his Theses with a remark on induction: 
“the noble Bacon who with a heroic attempt approached a new way, and in his new 
organ or logic set out to himself to [discover] the signs of nature which convince the 
 
53 More 1695: IV: “Nuda ac simplicis Perceptio, intime cum Iudicio cohaeret; ita cum suum cuique perceptioni 
respondere possit Judicium.” 
54 The regents regard Cartesianism as coherent with the Reformed faith : see my chapter on Reformed scholastic 
philosophy, part 5, in this volume. On the relationship between doctrines of the fall and empirical method and 
experimentalism, see Harrison 2007. 
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mind, and to demonstrate them non syllogistically, in the fashion of the common logic, 
but with the most severe induction.”55 
Peacock later compares Descartes and Bacon and declares that the former has imitated the 
latter and that he betrayed the fundamental empiricism and practical orientation of Bacon’s 
logic.56 In 1693, George Peacock further describes his idea of induction: “to form a universal 
judgment from several experiments and examples, which are usually called Instances”, and 
adds an account of the instances from Bacon’s Novum Organon.57 
Earlier in the century, the Saumur Scottish regent Marc Duncan succinctly tied the praise 
of induction and trust in the senses (direct realism): “Induction depends on the senses and 
experience, likewise demonstration depends on induction. Hence, it follows first that all 
human science comes from the senses: second, that the senses do not deceive us.”58 Before 
Bacon, Duncan puts the Aristotelian trust in the senses and induction at the core of 
philosophy. These long-established themes echoed in the Scottish reception of Descartes and 
Bacon. 
One area in which the regents do not follow Bacon (nor Descartes) is the syllogistic 
theory. They believe that the new logic of discovery, be it inductive with Bacon or 
methodologically sceptical with Descartes, replaced Aristotle’s Topics and that it is, just like 
the Topics, complementary to the syllogism. 
 
Logica nova and logica vetus: the syllogism 
 
The regents have an overall compatibilist view on the relations between old and new logic. 
The critiques to scholastic logic we have seen above are typically about the degeneration of 
logic, of the diversion from its main goal, not about logic per se. In the path from the 
scholastic predicables and categories to the Cartesian clear and distinct ideas, the regents did 
not discard the whole old logic with the dirty water. In addition to the continuities (the 
 
55 Peacock 1689: I: “nobilis Verul: qui ausu heroico novam tentare viam est aggressus, in cujus novo organo seu 
logica, pro scopo sibi proponit [invenire] indicationes operum naturae quae mentem convincunt, et in ordine 
demonstrandi non uti syllogismo, sicut ac in Logica vulgari, sed inductione idque castigatissima.” 
56 Peacock 1689: I: “auxilia a rebus ad perficiendum intellectum”. 
57 Peacock 1693: IV.: “Praecipuus inductionis usus est, ut ex variis experimentis vel exemplis, quae Instantiae 
solent appellari, judicium formetur universale.” 
58 Duncan 1610 : TL XXXI : “Inductio nititur sensu et experientia, sicut demonstratio inductione. Hinc liquet 
primo, omnem scientiam humanam esse a sensu: deinde, sensus non esse falsos nuncios.” 
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clarificatory and methodological aspects of logic, and the inductive method), the 
“Aristotelian” syllogism stands out in the late seventeenth-century Theses as a necessary 
logical component in the unfolding of the new science. Aristotle himself is saved from the 
attacks otherwise lent to the Peripatetics and scholastics together. 
King’s College regent George Fraser in 1695 openly defends Aristotelian logic with the 
distinction between theory and its misuse: “there are many positive things in Aristotle’s logic, 
and if some abuse of it, the faculty is not to blame, rather the perversity of those who use it: 
once it is cleansed of empty and useless subtleties, logic guides everything.”59 St Leonard’s 
College regent Alexander Grant in 1676 praises the usefulness of the syllogism: “since the 
simple representation of a thing, or the comparison of ideas, is not enough for the perfection 
of knowledge and the exchange between people, the mind steps in with [the faculty of] 
discourse, insofar as it progresses from one thing to the other; discourse of which the 
syllogistic construct is the most perfect example.”60 According to Grant, those who denigrate 
Aristotle’s syllogistic theory waste their time. Twenty years later, George Fraser makes the 
same point almost word for word.61 
The remark made by regents Grant and Fraser bear a distant resemblance with later 
Enlightenment views of the utility of philosophy and the intrinsic sociability of the 
philosopher. Although the regents’ remark occurs in the dry discussion of syllogistic theory, 
admittedly removed from everyday life, it further confirms a general impression about 
Scottish academic logic teaching. It is marked by a strong practical connotation: logic has to 
be useful, and what is more useful than an art which dispels mistakes, and clarifies thoughts 
and speech? One of logic’s uses is in the community of people, where a better verbal 
communication makes a better society. There is a fundamentally Humanist attitude, arguably 
 
59 Fraser 1695: III: “permulta sunt bonae frugis, in Aristotelis Logica, et quod aliqui ea abutantur, facultas ipsa 
culpabilis non est, sed ea male utentium perversitas: depurgatis enim inaniis et inutilibus argutiis, conducit 
universa.” 
60 Grant 1676: IV: “Cum enim ad cognitionis perfectionem et mutuum mortalium consortium, non sufficit 
simplex et rei repraesentatio, vel idearum comparatio, mens in subsidium advocat discursum, quatenus ab uno 
ad aliud progressum facit; cujus perfectissima species est fabrica syllogistica.” 
61 Fraser 1695: V: “Simplex rei repraesentatio, vel idearum comparatio, non sufficit ad cognitionis perfectionem, 
et mutuum mortalium consortium, quare mens in subsidium advocat Discursum.” 
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of Ramist origin, behind this conception of logic as an ultimately useful and practical 
discipline.62 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout the century, the regents put the utilitas of logic at the centre. In the first half of 
the century, logic teaching is about Aristotle (especially the Categories and Posterior 
Analytics) but with decisive Humanist and Reformed influences. Humanism is felt, rather 
than declared: the regents make no explicit references, but the themes of utilitas, method, 
induction, clarity and simplicity in logic, bear the mark of the new spirit of Humanist logic, 
as in Rudolph Agricola, Pierre de la Ramée, and his dissemination in Scotland via Andrew 
Melville. The complex technical scholastic disquisitions seem to be a thing of the past. The 
influence of the Reformation is visible in the discussion of the Doctrine of the Fall. Logic’s 
task is to correct our concepts, dispel error, and guide our reasoning. Ordo et syllogismus are 
the two principal instruments of the logician, and the regents perceived a strong coherence 
between Humanism and certain Reformed themes. 
In the second half of the century, logic’s utilitas remains at the centre of the new, modern 
logic. It is best experienced in the philosophical method of Cartesian origin: to combat 
infancy prejudices, to obtain clear and distinct perceptions, and to guarantee our inferences 
from particular to universal. Some regents, both before and after 1650, show great confidence 
in induction, but Francis Bacon only appears in the late 1680s, for example in the Aberdeen 
regent George Peacock. The regents do not take up two controversial aspects of the new 
philosophical method: the Cartesian view of mathematics as the paradigmatic science, and 
the Baconian and Cartesian critiques of the syllogism. Only occasionally is mathematics 
covered in the Theses although it was part of the curriculum and chairs in mathematics were 
being set up in Scotland at that time. The regents are compatibilist: the new logic of 
discovery has replaced the old Topics, but science still has to be delivered syllogistically. 
Methodus et syllogismus. 
The teaching of logic highlights a general trend in Scottish academic philosophy teaching: 
the extent in which the regents understood the diverse philosophical disciplines as defined by 
their final cause. Respectively, logic is introductory to philosophy and, for some regents, to 
theology as well. It seeks clarity, simplicity, and guidance for natural reason. Moral 
 
62 Reid 2011: 58: “Ramist logic was the ‘universal skeleton key’ that gave students destined to work as priests, 
civil servants and teachers the skills they needed for careers in public life.” 
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philosophy teaches us what a happy life is, in an intrinsic social dimension. Natural 
philosophy is the understanding of the natural world, and of the greater divine design 
revealed in nature. In this sense, the teaching of logic, and of philosophy in general, in the 
seventeenth-century Scottish universities is deeply Humanist, even when it presents a 
scholastic appearance. At issue here is a broad understanding of Humanism, one which brings 
together Andrew Melville, who used it to teach and propagate the Reformed faith more 
effectively, Pierre de la Ramée, whose anti-Aristotelianism directed the mind towards 
rhetoric and practical concerns, René Descartes and Francis Bacon, who sought to rebuild 
philosophy on more solid grounds. The history of logic teaching in the seventeenth-century 
Scottish universities is the collective unfolding of these three intertwined elements against the 
backdrop of Reformed scholasticism. 
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